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The recent adoption by the European
Parliament and Council of a
Regulation banning marketing and
importation of all seal products from
commercial hunting[1] has triggered
open opposition by Canada, Norway,
and other countries with seal hunting
traditions. Canada requested dispute
settlement consultations under the
World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement concerning this legislation – the WTO’s 400th trade dispute –
and was quickly joined by Norway.[2]
It is hard not to be emotional about the underlying issues, whichever side
you may be on. For those supporting the ban, it is an important step against
the cruel and inhumane practice of clubbing seals to death. But for those
who hunt seals, the hunt is their livelihood, and they claim it is practiced in a
manner that makes every effort to be responsible and is no worse than many
other common practices related to killing animals.
Background
The debate over trade in seal products has been ongoing since the 1980s,
when the European Council (EC) adopted a Directive banning importation of
seal pups’ skins and related products, and Canada ended commercial
hunting of “whitecoat” seal pups.[3] The latest EU ban, which covers all
products of commercial seal hunting, and the recent WTO consultation
requests filed in response, may open a new chapter in the debate. As the
chances of adjudication in the WTO’s dispute settlement system increase,
the role of WTO law becomes more important. There is still time for
negotiation. Indeed, the complainants’ preferred option may be to reach a
compromise settlement with the EU on these issues; for example, the parties
could reach agreement on humane standards for harvesting seals, thus
allowing the export of seal products to the EU as long as the standards are
met. Nonetheless, as the consultation process moves forward, it is worth
examining the relevant WTO law.
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WTO Provisions
The key provisions cited in the requests for consultations are the following:
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XI:1 (Import
Restrictions); GATT Article I:1 (Most Favored Nation Treatment); GATT Article
III:4 (National Treatment); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
Agreement) Article 2.1 (National Treatment and Most Favored Nation
Treatment); and TBT Agreement Article 2.2 (Necessity). In addition, the
European Union is almost certain to invoke some of the exceptions in GATT
Article XX as a defense, most likely sub-paragraph (a) (public morals),
sub-paragraph (b) (the part related to animal health), or sub-paragraph (g)
(conservation of exhaustible natural resources).
A full analysis of all of the legal issues involved would require a review of
some very detailed WTO jurisprudence, and is thus beyond the scope of this
piece. However, it is possible to briefly introduce some of the key legal
considerations at the heart of the case.
Non-discrimination
An important question in this case is whether the EU ban discriminates
against (or among) foreign products. This issue arises under TBT Agreement
Article 2.1, GATT Articles I: 1 and III:4, and the GATT Article XX introductory
clause.
The principle of non-discrimination is at the core of WTO rules. At first
glance, the EU ban seems consistent with this principle, as it is neutral on its
face. It does not single out “foreign” or ”imported” products, but rather
applies to all products, regardless of their country of origin. In practice,
however, the impact of the ban will fall most heavily upon foreign entities, in
particular those of Canada and Norway. Moreover, the law’s impact on some
foreign entities looks even more significant when it is pointed out that the EU
does not ban bullfighting or other arguably similar cruel or inhumane
practices involving livestock or other animals. The question might be raised
why the EU did not pass a broad animal welfare law that sets out rules for
both foreign and domestic products, instead of focusing only on the narrow
sub-category of seal products, a sub-category made up almost exclusively of
foreign goods.
Necessity of the Measure
A second overarching legal issue is whether the ban is necessary to achieve
the EU’s animal welfare goals. Considerations of necessity arise under TBT
Agreement Article 2.2, as well as affirmative defenses under GATT Articles
XX (a), for measures necessary to protect public morals, and XX (b), for
measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health.
Under the necessity provisions, adjudicators will weigh the measure’s
contribution to its goals against its negative impact on trade. A question that
might arise in this regard is whether there is a less onerous measure that
would accomplish the same policy goals without affecting trade as much.
For example, instead of a ban, the EU could label seal products to inform
consumers about the harms to seals, thus allowing the consumers to make
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an informed purchasing decision (this alternative was proposed during the
EU parliamentary debate on the measure). The exemption for products of
seal hunting by Inuits[4] or non-profit entities also may call into question the
contribution the measure makes to its purported goals.
As an additional point, if the EU argues that its ban is justified under GATT
Article XX (a) or (b), a WTO panel could be faced with the difficult task of
determining whether an importing WTO Member can justify import bans
reacting to events occurring outside its own territory. And if the WTO were to
accept the EU’s justification for an import ban on seal products based on EU
consumers’ moral concerns about seal harvesting practices abroad, then
what happens if a WTO Member’s law punishes imports from countries that
do not legally guarantee labor rights based on moral concerns?
Issues under the TBT Agreement
The TBT Agreement is a relatively new trade agreement with little
jurisprudence to help explain the scope of its provisions. As a result, the
likely outcome of claims under this Agreement is difficult to assess. One
initial consideration is whether the Agreement even applies, as the EU may
argue that the seal products ban is not a “technical regulation” that is
covered by the Agreement.
Assuming the TBT Agreement applies, a systemic issue that may be of
importance in this case is the relationship between GATT Article XX and the
TBT Agreement. While the TBT Agreement establishes non-discrimination as
an obligation, the TBT Agreement (unlike the GATT) does not have an
exception for health/environment/public morals measures. Instead, it
establishes a separate obligation related to measures used for these
purposes. Thus, instead of the rule-exception framework of GATT Articles I
and III, on the one hand, and GATT Article XX, on the other hand, the TBT
Agreement appears to set out two separate rules: one rule requiring
most-favored nation/national treatment and another rule requiring that
measures be no more trade-restrictive than necessary.
One result of this structure is that the TBT Agreement, unlike the GATT,
appears to provide no legal shelter for measures that deny national
treatment. Thus, where under the GATT a national treatment violation could
be defended under GATT Article XX, under the TBT Agreement no such
defense exists. At first glance, it appears that the TBT Agreement rules are
much stricter. However, it may be worth noting the following preambular
language in the TBT Agreement:
Recognizing that no country should be prevented from taking
measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the
environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the
levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that
they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on
international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement.
While this language does not create an obligation, it does “recognize” that
certain measures should not be prevented. In this regard, it loosely tracks
the language of GATT Article XX, including the sub-paragraphs that allow
countries to pursue specific policies, as well as the non-discrimination
requirement of the Article XX introductory clause (the “chapeau”). In
particular, the preambular language refers to measures “necessary . . . for
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment”
—similar to the language of Articles XX(b) and (g)—and “the requirement
that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade” (the
language of Article XX’s introductory clause). In a sense, the language reads
like an exception, although the use of the terms “should” and “recognize”
appears to prevent it from being operative. Thus, a key question in the seal
products dispute may be, what impact does this language have on the
interpretation of the TBT Agreement obligations?[5]
Conclusions
One might expect that core WTO principles, such as non-discrimination and
necessity, would have clear legal standards. However, trade adjudicators
have gone back and forth over the years on the issue of non-discrimination,
while the “necessity” standard has evolved and has yet to be examined in
the TBT Agreement context. There is a great deal of uncertainty as to how a
WTO panel would address these issues in the context of the seal products
ban in dispute. Thus, the outcome of a panel dispute would be far from sure.
In addition to all of the legal arguments, a more general question underlying
this dispute is the following: To what extent should WTO rules intrude into
the domestic policies of member governments? Most people can see the
connection to trade of an explicitly discriminatory measure that says, for
example, “foreign products are not allowed.” However, when a WTO panel
rules on laws that are nominally origin-neutral, like the seal products ban, a
finding of WTO-inconsistency may be viewed as meddling in domestic
regulation, undercutting the WTO’s legitimacy. It would matter very much
how a WTO panel hearing this case approached its review. Any ruling that
this ban violates WTO rules should be spelled out in plain and simple terms
that ordinary people can understand, and not buried in legal jargon.
Otherwise, the strong emotions of the case may rise up to overshadow and
undermine the legal aspects.
Along with the relationship between WTO law and domestic regulatory
autonomy, the panel may also have to navigate the connection between
WTO law and international law. For example, in support of arguments that
the ban is not justified, the complainants may emphasize the role of
international agreements in the protection of animal welfare. In the absence
of such agreements on seal hunting, the claimants may argue that unilateral
trade action is not permitted. Addressing such international law issues in
GATT/WTO dispute settlement has been controversial in the past and is
likely to be so here as well.
As a final point, given the legal uncertainties and the sensitive issues
involved, it is possible that “politics” could play an important role as well. In
this regard, it may be worth recalling a dispute between Canada and the EU
from a few years ago with similar legal claims and sensitivities: the EC -
Asbestos[6] dispute, which involved an EU ban on certain asbestos products.
There, Canada’s legal claims were rejected. However, a good deal of legal
uncertainty remained even after the panel and Appellate Body reports were
circulated.[7] While the cases have a number of differences, and thus
drawing guidance from Asbestos should be done with caution, one lesson
may be the following: when confronted with difficult legal issues, in a
situation where the legitimacy of the WTO might be called into question, the
panelists hearing a case will almost certainly feel the pull of “politics,” as
much as they may try their best to ignore it.
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